This article provides a comparative analysis of the rules of conduct governing legal representatives in Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom as they apply to a range of ethical issues in mediation. The analysis has four main aims. First, it clarifies the position in Australia and the USA -the Australian and American mediation communities have not introduced separate codes for 'mediation advocates' as Mason recently suggested. But some provisions have been made for mediation practice. The second aim is to tease out from these provisions learning points for policy makers and rule drafters. Amongst the points to consider is whether or not, and under what circumstances, mediators should be regarded as courts, or as third parties for the purpose of the rules. Third, the analysis provides some grounds for arguing that the current rules of conduct are appropriate for legal representatives in mediation. Fourth, it identifies challenges associated with proposals to introduce rules which require legal representatives to participate in mediation in good faith in a non-adversarial manner according to higher standards of honesty and candour. The article concludes by identifying a number of assumptions which permeate the literature on this topic.
INTRODUCTION
Many lawyers are now involved in mediation, either as a mediator or as a legal representative for one of the parties to the mediation. These roles raise a host of new ethical dilemmas for lawyers. A central question arises as to whether or not these dilemmas can be resolved through the application of existing rules of professional conduct for lawyers. The question seems to have been answered relatively easily in the case of lawyer mediators. Since mediators have no 'client' in the classic sense of the term, the existing rules seemed obviously not to fit their activities.
1 Separate or supplementary ethical standards and guidelines have been developed for lawyer mediators in most jurisdictions by the professional bodies to which they belong 2 (and by a number of other ADR practitioner accreditation organisations whose membership is not restricted to lawyers). 3 In the case of legal representatives, the answer to whether or not new or supplementary rules are needed for mediation practice is still being debated. Jim Mason is the latest contributor to this debate. 4 Mason's main concern is 'whether an additional mediation advocates' code is worthwhile in the quest to curb the adversarial imperative'. 5 While Mason does not take on the task of drafting a new code, 6 he suggests that such a code would need to be concentrated around three principles, namely: non-adversarial behaviour as the norm, good faith participation, and honesty vis à vis mediators. 7 These are common 'themes' for commentators who call for new rules of conduct for mediation practice. In formulating his proposals, Mason draws on, and suggests that rule drafters in the United Kingdom (UK) might look to, initiatives in such jurisdictions as Australia and the United States of America (USA). This article clarifies the position of legal representatives under the rules in Australia and the USA -in neither jurisdiction do the rules 'cover advocates' practice during arbitration and mediation' 8 in any manner which is unique to mediation or different from ethical practice in litigation. Some accommodation for mediation has been made in the rules in Australia (the term 'court' has been defined to include 'mediations') and in the USA (cases and commentary suggest that a judge acting as a mediator should be treated as a tribunal). These provisions -while not amounting to a code -offer important learning points for policy makers and rule drafters in all jurisdictions.
To that end, this article provides a comparative analysis of the rules of professional conduct governing legal representatives in mediation in Australia, the USA and the UK. It is in eight parts. Part 2 examines the general duties owed by legal representatives in mediation and the sources of those duties. The question of where mediators belong in this predominantly tripartite system of duties is raised. Part 3 focuses on the particular duties owed by lawyers regardless of whether they are dealing with a court, a client or a third party. These are the lawyer's obligations to be honest, fair and courteous. An important point arises from this discussion: although lawyers owe duties of honesty, courtesy and fairness to courts, clients and third parties with whom they deal, different standards are owed to each of these 'entities'. Thus, the answer to the question of where mediators belong in the current scheme is an important one.
Part 4 considers whether or not lawyers are subject to a duty to act in good faith and to cooperate in mediation. Part 5 posits seven ethical dilemmas which might confront legal representatives in mediation and suggests how they might be resolved using the current framework of professional conduct rules. In the author's opinion, these dilemmas can be resolved satisfactorily without the need for recourse to supplementary rules.
Part 6 evaluates a number of proposals for new rules for mediation practice and highlights challenges facing policy makers and rule drafters. Part 7 identifies some of the assumptions which permeate our work in relation to the regulation of lawyers' conduct in mediation. The the case of mandatory mediations). The focus in this article is on the rules of conduct promulgated by lawyers' professional bodies for they set minimum standards which apply to legal representatives regardless of how mediation comes about. 18 The article briefly considers general law and procedural law requirements in so far as they impact the duties owed under the rules.
Recently, there have been a number of changes made to the professional conduct rules in the jurisdictions under consideration, although none have had an impact on mediation practice. In some Australian jurisdictions, solicitors are now governed by the Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules (hereafter ASCR) rather than the Law Council of Australia's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice (hereafter the Model Rules) on which Mason based his observations. 19 The Model Rules (or a variant of them) continue to be used in other states and territories of Australia. New national conduct rules for barristers have also been adopted in some states and territories. 20 This article focuses on the ASCR and the new Barristers' Conduct Rules (hereafter Australian Bar Rules). In the UK, solicitors are governed by the Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct 2011 (hereafter SRA Code of Conduct) which replaced the Solicitors' Code of Conduct 2007 . 21 Barristers in the UK are still governed by the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (hereafter UK Bar Rules). 22 The main source of regulation for lawyers in the USA is the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereafter the ABA Model Rules) which have been adopted in whole or in part by most states. 23 18 It is widely agreed that these rules set only minimum standards or base levels of conduct rather than ceilings. With one exception, law societies and bar associations in Australia, the UK and the USA have not promulgated new or supplementary rules to govern their members' conduct when they are acting as legal representatives in mediation. The exception is paragraph 708.1 of the UK Bar Rules which makes specific provision about the need for 'honesty' in mediation. One accommodation has been made for mediation in the Australian Rules: both sets of conduct rules in Australia define 'court' to include 'mediations (and arbitrations)'. 24 These provisions are discussed in more detail later in the article.
Some non-binding guidelines for legal representatives in mediation have emerged in Australia and the USA (and it is to these guidelines that Mason refers in the body of his work). 25 The Law Council of Australia (LCA) published Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediation in March 2007. 26 These guidelines do not impose any additional obligations on legal practitioners; nor do they derogate from the usual obligations imposed on them. 27 The American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations (hereafter ABA's Settlement Guidelines) in 2002. As its title suggests, the ABA's Settlement Guidelines are aimed at settlement negotiations. While the ABA notes that '[a]s a general rule ... the involvement of a third party neutral in the settlement process does not change the attorney's ethical obligations', 28 it also makes it clear that 'to the extent there may be ethical issues specific to mediation', those issues are beyond the scope of the Settlement Guidelines. 29 As is the case with the guidelines in Australia, the ABA's Settlement Guidelines do not 'replace existing law or rules of professional conduct ... and should not serve as a basis for civil liability, sanctions, or disciplinary action'.
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From the various sources mentioned above, a number of duties are imposed on legal practitioners. Of paramount importance is the practitioner's duty to the court and the administration of justice. 31 As an aspect of the duty to the administration of justice, legal practitioners must comply with the law including the rules of conduct of the profession. They must foster respect for the law and its administration. 32 They must behave in a way which maintains the trust placed in them by the profession and the public. 33 They must not engage in, or assist, conduct that is illegal or dishonest or otherwise discreditable to a practitioner, prejudicial to the administration of justice or which might otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute. 34 Importantly, these general duties are not restricted to court 24 The Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules (hereafter ASCR) and the Australian Bar Rules define 'court' to mean any body described as such, a range of judicial and statutory tribunals, investigations and inquiries established by statute or a Parliament, Royal Commissions and 'arbitrations and mediations' (with the ASCR using the phrase 'an arbitration or mediation or any other form of dispute resolution'): see glossary of terms, ASCR and definitions section, Australian Bar Rules. proceedings; nor are they 'far removed from mediation practice'. 35 Rather, they apply to all aspects of a lawyer's professional and personal life.
36 So important are they, that they are variously described as 'fundamental ethical duties', 37 'fundamental principles', 38 and 'mandatory principles which apply to all' and which 'embody key ethical requirements' 39 of those involved in the provision of legal services.
A Tripartite System of Duties
The professional conduct rules provide a number of specific duties that are owed to courts, clients and other parties. For instance, legal practitioners must act with honesty, 40 fairness and courtesy towards courts and other tribunals. 41 They must ensure that proper and responsible use is made of the court process and privilege (a lawyer cannot, for example, make allegations in court unless he or she has reasonable grounds for supporting them) and use their best endeavours to avoid unnecessary expense or waste of the court's time.
Legal practitioners owe a range of duties to their clients such as those of honesty and courtesy, 42 competence and diligence, 43 loyalty 44 and confidentiality. 45 The scope of the duty of confidentiality depends on the source to which it is traced 46 but it is generally 'very broad'. 47 It is subject to a number of exceptions, for example, disclosure is permitted when it is 'for the sole purpose of avoiding the probable commission of a serious criminal offence'. 48 Disclosure of information may also be authorised by the client to whom the duty is owed.
Legal practitioners also owe duties to third parties, including their opponents. Each jurisdiction uses slightly different terminology to describe the ambit of these duties but the basic thrust of the rules is the same -legal practitioners must act with honesty, courtesy and fairness towards third parties with whom they deal.
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As this discussion illustrates, for the most part, lawyers' duties can be categorised according to whether they are owed to the court, a client or a third party. Although this categorisation risks over-generalisation, 50 it is useful when considering the position of 35 mediators who like clients and third parties (and even judges), are identifiable individuals. The position of mediators is considered in more detail next.
Mediators: Courts (Judges) or Third Parties?
The question arises as to whether mediators should be treated, and afforded the same duties, as courts, or alternatively as third parties. It appears that different answers have been adopted by lawyers' professional bodies in the jurisdictions under consideration.
Crucially to the position in Australia, both sets of rules (that is, those for solicitors and those for barristers) define 'court' to include 'mediations'. 51 Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the drafters of the rules meant mediators and/or the other parties to the mediation, or the mediation process. (This uncertainty does not arise when one is dealing with a court for the court is personified by the judge, tribunal member or other official person such as a court registrar before whom legal practitioners appear). The most obvious interpretation is that the reference to 'mediations' is intended to mean 'mediators'. This is because: 52 1. There are already rules in place governing relations with opponents and other third parties. 53 The only 'entity' for whom provision is not otherwise made is the mediator. 2. It is difficult to conceive of practitioners owing duties to a process (although clearly, they may owe duties to certain persons, entities or even 'the public' involved in, or implicated by, a process). The Australian approach (and that of the Canadian Federation of Law Societies) is the least common. The more common approach is to restrict the definition of 'court' or 'tribunal' to bodies that are adjudicative in nature, an approach which excludes mediation. This is the approach adopted in the ABA Model Rules; 56 the SRA Code of Conduct 57 (and its predecessor, the Solicitors' Code of Conduct 2007), 58 and the UK Bar Rules. 59 The rules governing relations with courts and tribunals in these jurisdictions (for example, Rule 3.3 of the ABA Model Rules) also make no reference to mediation. The implications of including 'mediations' in the definition of court (or conversely, not including it) are discussed in more detail in the next part of the article. 51 See definitions (n 24). 
PARTICULAR DUTIES OWED BY LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
To all of the entities with whom they deal, that is, courts, clients and third parties, legal practitioners owe a duty to act with honesty (but not necessarily with candour), 60 fairness 61 and courtesy. 62 However, as the discussion which follows shows, different standards are owed depending on whether practitioners are dealing with a court, or a third party. Other possible duties -such as a duty to participate in various dispute resolution processes in good faith and a duty to cooperate with other participants, are emerging in the literature, court rules and some statutory schemes. The discussion below focuses on the requirement of honesty for it is a central component of all other duties owed by lawyers.
The Duty of Honesty
The term 'honesty' is not defined by the rules. An analysis of particular rules in each jurisdiction indicates that a distinction can be drawn between the concepts of honesty as against misrepresentation (an issue which concerns the accuracy of information conveyed), and candour as against non-disclosure (an issue which concerns the sharing of information or conversely, the withholding of it). 63 As will become apparent, while legal representatives are subject to a duty of honesty, they are generally not subject to a duty of candour.
Standard owed to the Court
In all jurisdictions under consideration, legal representatives are prohibited from deceiving or knowingly or recklessly misleading the court. 64 They are obliged to correct any misleading statement as soon as possible after becoming aware that it is misleading. 65 In simple terms, practitioners should never provide the court with inaccurate information about any matter. As for the obligation of candour to the court, a distinction is made in the rules between matters of law and matters of fact. A practitioner must inform the court of any relevant binding authorities and legislative provisions of which he or she is aware 66 but as a general rule -at least when one's opponent is also present before the court, 67 there is no obligation to disclose adverse facts 68 and there is no obligation to 'correct an error in a statement made to the court by the opponent or any other person'. 69 This is not to say that adverse facts should never be revealed to the court; rather that they should not be revealed without client consent. 70 
Standards owed to Opponents
As to the duty of honesty owed to opponents or counterparts in mediation, the relevant rules are as follows:
1. In Australia, lawyers are prohibited from knowingly making false statements to an opponent in relation to the case, including its compromise. 71 Although this rule appears to be limited in its application by the title 'advocacy and litigation', the court has held that rules such as this apply beyond the context of litigation to other aspects of legal practice. The prohibition against misleading one's opponent does not extend to all statements. In Australia and the USA, statements about 'immaterial' matters or matters that do not relate to fact or law are not caught by the rules. 75 Under the rules in both jurisdictions, some allowance is made for posturing, exaggeration and bluffing. For instance, in Australia, Rule 34.1.1 of the ASCR allows exaggeration as long as statements do not 'grossly' exceed 'the legitimate assertion of the rights or entitlements of the [practitioner's] client', and the LCA Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations, while warning practitioners to 'be careful of puffing', do not prohibit it. 76 In the USA, commentary to the ABA's Model Rule 4.1 provides that certain types of statements 'ordinarily are not taken as statements of material facts'.
77 Such statements include '[e]stimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction' 78 and statements about 'a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim'. 79 Ultimately, the question as to whether or not there has been a false statement about a material fact will 70 In this instance, the public interest in maintaining legal professional privilege outweighs the public interest in discovering the truth: Dal Pont (n 17) 384, 386. On the importance of maintaining lawyer-client confidentiality, see Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, 236 (Lord Millett). 71 ASCR, r 22.1; Australian Bar Rules, r 48. The term 'compromise' is defined in the ASCR to include 'any form of settlement of a case, whether pursuant to a formal offer under the rules or procedure of a court, or otherwise': glossary of terms. 72 turn on the facts of the case. 80 'As one author opines, "made-up" alternative offers might be treated as a misrepresentation of material fact when the opponent is unsophisticated; the offers are specific, are coupled with ultimatums, and are impossible to investigate'. 81 The current UK provision for solicitors is not very precise (nor was its predecessor Rule 10.01 of the Solicitors' Code of Conduct 2007). 82 Boon and Levin suggest that we might seek guidance in Principle 19.01 of the earlier Guide for solicitors which raised the issues more explicitly, requiring practitioners to 'act towards other solicitors with frankness and good faith consistent with the overriding duty to the client'. 83 As to what these phrases meant, Boon and Levin suggest that '[f]rankness could have meant that information supplied was to be accurate' 84 while good faith suggested a 'refusal to seek an unconscionable advantage'.
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A duty of frankness (or in the terminology adopted here, a duty of honesty) does not prohibit all misleading statements. Boon and Levin note that bluffing in negotiation 'has been defended from a number of positions', 86 such that it 'can be seen part [sic] of the process of concession exchange rather than outright deception'. 87 While not condoning it, they acknowledge that '[i]f positional bargaining is accepted in professional circles, only a fool would conduct it by telling the other side immediately the minimum payment he would accept ' . 88 It appears then that solicitors in the UK can also bluff and exaggerate and mislead on immaterial matters such as the client's acceptable settlement point.
It is not clear that paragraph 708.1 of the UK Bar Rules imposes a higher standard of honesty on barristers in that jurisdiction. The provision is unique in its application to mediation, as discussed further below. Notably, the provision has not been retained in the draft new Code for barristers. 89 As to the requirements to share information with an opponent, for the most part, the rules in Australia and the USA speak to actions, not omissions. While they prohibit certain misrepresentations, they generally require no affirmative disclosure. 90 There is no obligation to inform an opposing party of relevant facts or law, 91 by substantive law, procedural law or specific legislative directive. 92 Nor is there any obligation to correct the other side's misunderstandings, misconceptions or false assumptions 93 providing that a practitioner is not 'the moving force ... in the other side's misconception' 94 and that he or she is scrupulous about not endorsing any misunderstanding. 95 The position of UK solicitors vis à vis their opponents was articulated by the court in Thames Trains Ltd v Adams. 96 There, the court was concerned with the application of Principle 19.01 of the Guide and the general law. The plaintiff's solicitor in a personal injuries case accepted an offer to settle paid into court by the defendant. Acceptance was made by a fax sent to the office of the defendant's solicitor. The fax was not received because of a systems error at that office. A more favourable offer was subsequently made by the defendant during a telephone conversation between the parties' solicitors. 97 The plaintiff's solicitor accepted the increased offer and did not inform the defendant's solicitor about the fax. The defendant sought to have the settlement agreement set aside on learning about the fax. The court held that the conduct of the plaintiff's solicitor was 'not unconscionable, nor deceitful, nor sharp practice, nor was she taking unfair advantage' of the ignorance of the other side. 98 The duty of frankness did not extend to speaking out to correct the opponent's misapprehension 'where speaking out would not be in the client's interests'. 99 The court noted that a different outcome may have ensued had the defendant asked the plaintiff's lawyer a specific question about the earlier transaction.
100 Importantly, his Honour Justice Nelson took into account a number of case-specific circumstances in arriving at the conclusion that the solicitor concerned was entitled to remain silent and accept the increased offer.
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There are a number of exceptions to the general rule that candour is not required. 102 First, there is a duty to correct an opponent in the case of obvious errors in some circumstances, for instance, when taking advantage of the error 'would obtain for a client a benefit which has no supportable foundation in law or fact'. 103 information when it is required to qualify a statement or to avoid a partial truth (that is to say, the prohibition against misleading extends to statements which are false by reason of the need for some qualification or the addition of omitted information). Thus, in what is regarded as a classic example of the positive duty to disclose relevant information, the Court held that a statement that a property subject to sale was 'fully let', ought to have been qualified by the information that the tenants in question had given notice to quit. 104 Third, disclosure is required when it is necessary to correct a statement previously made by the practitioner about a client's case where the practitioner now knows the statement to be false. 105 The same exceptions have been etched out in the general law.
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Standards owed to Mediators
The standards of honesty and candour owed to mediators vary between jurisdictions, primarily because of the different definitions of 'court' and 'tribunal' adopted in the rules.
The Australian rules define 'court' to include 'mediations'. If this reference is taken to mean 'mediators', legal representatives in Australia owe mediators the same standards of honesty and candour as they owe to courts and tribunals. They are prohibited from providing mediators with inaccurate information about any matter, a prohibition which might extend to statements concerning a client's position, interests, settlement priorities, settlement goals and the extent of the lawyer's settlement authority. They are subject to a duty to inform mediators of any relevant binding authorities and legislative provisions of which they are aware. The rules do not stipulate whether disclosure has to be made in a joint session with all the parties present or whether disclosure in a separate session will suffice. 107 Legal representatives are not subject to a duty to inform mediators about adverse facts (nor are they obliged to disclose information pertaining to their client's position, interests, settlement priorities or goals, or the extent of their authority to settle) and they have no obligation to correct inaccurate statements made to the mediator by the other side.
The ABA Model Rules do not define 'tribunal' to include mediations or mediators. The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has confirmed that a mediator is not a 'tribunal' as defined in Model Rule 1.0 108 and that a lawyer's 'duty of candour' both toward mediators and other parties in mediation is governed by Rule 4.1. This is the case even when the mediation is 'caucused'. 109 Thus, legal practitioners in the USA owe mediators the same standards of honesty and candour as they owe to their opponents -at least this is the case when the mediator is not a judge. The Committee has also opined that Rule 3.3 (which governs candour to a tribunal) applies to 'statements made to a tribunal when the tribunal itself is participating in settlement negotiations, including court-sponsored mediation in which a judge participates'.
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It is difficult to reconcile the Committee's opinions. Richmond has suggested that the Committee's analysis with respect to the application of Rule 4.1 to caucused mediations 'was abbreviated, and its conclusion is therefore debatable'. 111 Richmond favours the imposition of a higher standard of honesty and candour, that is, the standard set out in Rule 3.3, at least for court-sponsored mediations. 112 The better view may be that the standard of Rule 4.1 is sufficient.
The kind of situation envisaged by the Committee arose in In Re Fee. 113 In this medical malpractice action, the parties negotiated a settlement with the 'assistance' of a settlement judge from the court in which the matter was pending. The settlement hinged partly on the contingency fees which the plaintiff was to pay to her lawyers. The plaintiff's lawyers allowed the judge-mediator to think that a particular fee arrangement had been agreed and failed to disclose the existence of a new fee agreement arrived at in a separate meeting with their client. (The judge had earlier expressed the opinion that the fees were excessive). The Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 3.3(a)(1) applied and that 'a judge acting as [a] mediator is still a judge to whom the ethical duty of candor is owed'. 114 The court found that the lawyers had violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) of Arizona's professional conduct rules.
It is suggested that the lesson to be learned from In Re Fee is that a legal practitioner should not mislead a mediator about a material fact. It was not necessary for the court in In Re Fee to rely on Rule 3.3. The same result would have been achieved through an application of Rule 4.1 which prohibits the making of false statements (including 'half-truths') to third parties. The lawyers misled the judge-mediator about a material fact by allowing him to affirm (by reading out) terms of settlement which were no longer an accurate reflection of the agreement arrived at between them and their client. The Arizona Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the 'respondents should have either disclosed the complete arrangement or politely declined any discussion of fees'. 115 A positive obligation to speak out only arose because of the conduct of the lawyers.
In the UK, the SRA Code of Conduct restricts the definition of 'court' to adjudicative bodies. There is no mention of mediators or mediations. In the absence of alternative provisions, it appears that solicitors in the UK owe mediators the same obligations as they owe to third parties. Thus, while they should not mislead mediators -at least in relation to material facts and law -they have no obligation to convey information to mediators, except in the limited circumstances discussed above (that is, to correct a half-truth or a statement now known to be false). the mediator or any party or their representative'. 116 However, it seems unlikely that this provision has raised the standards of honesty and candour owed to mediators (or to other parties to the mediation) for while the rule prohibits misleading, it does not require candour, that is, there is no obligation to reveal information. It is not clear whether the rule prohibits all misleading or only misleading in relation to material facts and law. As mentioned above, the rule has not been retained in the draft new Code.
Requirements in Relation to Fairness and Courtesy
Legal representatives owe a duty of fairness to those with whom they deal (the rules do not appear to set different standards for courts and third parties). The concept of 'fairness' is not defined in the rules. 117 It is a concept which can be applied both to the procedure and outcome of a dispute resolution process. Sometimes procedural unfairness (for example, failure to disclose vital information) will bring about an unfair outcome. As this simple example illustrates, 'fairness' overlaps with the concepts of 'honesty' and 'candour'.
In the context of mediation, it is suggested that legal representatives discharge their duty of fairness with respect to procedural matters by complying with reasonable guidelines set by the mediator since the mediator is explicitly responsible for ensuring procedural fairness. Lawyers act contrary to the requirements of procedural fairness in mediation when they make threats, attempt to cross-examine or interrogate the other party or do not allow the other party to speak freely. The concept of fairness also overlaps with that of 'courtesy' and includes matters such as not interrupting when someone else is speaking and not denigrating a party. Most mediators will intervene to correct the types of inappropriate behaviour mentioned here.
Legal representatives have no specific obligation to ensure that a mediated outcome is fair to other parties to the mediation (or other affected third parties) except where special obligations are imposed by legislation as is the case in family law matters. 118 That said, lawyers must keep in mind their duty to the administration of justice. In some cases the court has held that a lawyer's actions in securing an agreement and in failing to disclose information to an opponent were so unfair that the agreement in question should be set aside. The grounds relied on by the court in setting aside these agreements have varied -ranging from breach of principles of contract law, 119 to breach of the practitioner's common law obligations to the administration of justice and to the court, to breach of the professional conduct rules. 120 • The plaintiff's lawyer failed to advise the defendant that the plaintiff in a personal injuries action had died from unrelated factors prior to completion of settlement discussions.
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• The defendant's lawyer failed to tell the plaintiff that he had a life-threatening medical condition which had been overlooked by the plaintiff's own doctors.
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• The plaintiff's barrister and solicitor failed to inform the defendant that the plaintiff in a personal injuries matter had been diagnosed with terminal cancer subsequent to the provision of estimates of future losses. 123 It is difficult to glean general principles from these cases with decisions about what is fair or unfair depending on an assessment of case-specific circumstances.
THE IMPACT OF OTHER DUTIES OWED BY LAWYERS
The Question of Good Faith Participation
Currently the professional conduct rules do not impose on legal representatives a specific obligation to participate in mediation in good faith. But absence of explicit provision does not give practitioners a licence to act in bad faith. They are still bound by their general duties. Some guidelines for mediation issued by lawyers' professional associations do seek to impose an obligation of good faith on the parties and their lawyers. For example, Guideline 2.2 of the LCA Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations provides that '[l]awyers and clients should act, at all times, in good faith to attempt to achieve settlement of the dispute'. 124 It further provides that '[a] lawyer should not continue to represent clients who act in bad faith or give instructions which are inconsistent with good faith'. 125 Guideline 2.3 of the ABA's Settlement Guidelines states that '[a] lawyer's conduct in negotiating a settlement should be characterized by honor and fair-dealing', 126 while Guideline 4.3.1 provides that '[a]n attorney may not employ the settlement process in bad faith'. There is also a plethora of legislation in Australia and the USA which imposes on parties an obligation to participate in 'good faith' or to act 'genuinely' in mediation. 127 and commentaries concerning good faith obligations in agreements to mediate and dispute resolution clauses. They include some preparation, attendance at the mediation and having someone in attendance with authority to settle. 128 Similarly, there is agreement that some behaviour, such as misleading a mediator or an opponent about a material fact, will constitute bad faith (the distinction between misleading which is prohibited, and non-disclosure which is generally permitted, still holds). 129 Regard can also be had to the Committee Notes which accompany Guideline 4.3.1 of the ABA Settlement Guidelines. The Notes provide examples of bad faith behaviour in mediation. They include use of mediation 'solely' to delay litigation (or to burden the opposing party) or to secure discovery. 130 But these common threads do not add up to universally agreed definitions of good and bad faith. Mason observes that 'good faith provisions frequently flounder domestically on the grounds that "no-one is quite sure what they mean."' 131 He was speaking of the position in the UK. This is also the case in Australia and the USA. The court in Australia has on some occasions struck down dispute resolution clauses containing good faith provisions on the ground that such provisions are too vague as to the conduct required of the parties and hence, too uncertain to be enforceable. 132 More recently the New South Wales Court of Appeal expressed the view that '[w]hat the phrase "good faith" signifies in any particular context and contract will depend on that context and that contract'. 133 Similar views have been expressed by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. 134 Ultimately, decisions about whether or not a legal representative has acted in good faith or bad faith will turn on a combination of factors set in the context of each individual case.
Requirements in Relation to Cooperation
The professional conduct rules do not require practitioners to cooperate with mediators or with opponents in mediation. As Peppet summed up in relation to negotiation, there is no professional requirement 'to cooperate rather than compete'.
Practitioners are required to maintain a certain level of cooperation and collegiality with each other in order to discharge their duties to the court in the conduct of litigation, an obligation which can be sourced to general law 136 and to procedural law requirements. In most jurisdictions, procedural law now regulates the pre-action conduct of the parties and their advisers. Parties are required to 'cooperate' with each other and the court 137 and to 'use reasonable endeavours to resolve a dispute by agreement ... by appropriate dispute resolution', 138 as well as to exchange stipulated information and documents. 139 The term 'cooperation' is generally not defined, although some legislation provides examples of steps 'that could be taken by a person as part of taking genuine steps to resolve a dispute'. 140 In applying legislation such as this, the courts have indicated that decisions as to whether or not genuine steps have been taken depend on the nature and circumstances of the dispute. 
RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN MEDIATION
In mediation, as in any other context, the duties owed by lawyers may conflict. An ethical dilemma might arise in mediation where: 142 1. A client instructs his or her lawyer to mislead a mediator and/or an opponent about material facts. 2. A legal representative is instructed to mislead a mediator and/or an opponent about the client's bottom line. 3. A legal representative knows of a binding legal authority which is adverse to the client's interests. 4. A legal representative has made a statement to the mediator and/or an opponent which statement the practitioner now knows to be false. 5. A client instructs her legal representative to withhold confidential information from the mediator and/or from an opponent. 6. A legal representative is instructed to use mediation for an 'improper purpose' such as to delay commencement of legal proceedings or to fish for information. In each of these situations, there is potential for conflict between the duties owed to the client and the duties owed to the administration of justice, to the mediator and to an opponent. Some guidance on the relative priority to be given to particular duties is provided in the professional conduct rules and in the general law in the UK and Australia. First, a legal practitioner is an officer of the court and as a consequence, he or she owes an 'overriding' or 136 'paramount' duty to the court and the administration of justice rather than to the client. 144 Second, duties owed to clients will normally take precedence over those owed to third parties except where action (or inaction) taken on the client's behalf also impinges on duties owed to the administration of justice. 145 Third, whenever there is a conflict between the duties owed by lawyers, they should exercise an independent judgment in the conduct and management of a case. 146 The principle of lawyer independence is not confined to litigation. 147 Lawyers in the USA are also recognised as officers of the legal system 148 but the matter of relative priorities -and the question of lawyer independence versus client authority, is stated in different terms. The ABA Model Rules provide that lawyers shall abide by their client's decisions in respect of objectives to be achieved from a representation providing those objectives are lawful and consult with their client in respect of the means used to achieve objectives where means includes styles, approaches and tactics to be used in the mediation. 149 Application of these principles to the ethical dilemmas posited above suggests the following outcomes:
1. The rules prohibit practitioners from making false or misleading statements about material facts to third parties -mediators and opponents (the decision as to whether or not a statement pertains to material facts will depend on the facts of the case). Practitioners should not follow their client's instructions in this situation.
2. There is some room for puffing under the rules and the general law in all jurisdictions. Statements which exaggerate bottom lines are not problematic as long as they are not framed as factual misrepresentations. The line between permissible puffing and misleading will often depend on case-specific factors.
5. It is impossible to suggest an appropriate course of action for a lawyer who finds himself or herself in the fifth situation without knowing the specifics of the information which the client wants to withhold. Legal representatives are not under a duty to disclose information about the client's interests, bottom lines and willingness to settle, either to a mediator or to an opponent. But the cases mentioned above are sufficient to illustrate that in some circumstances, failure to disclose information (such as information about the existence of a life-threatening medical condition in the other party) will constitute a breach of a lawyer's paramount duty to the administration of justice. This is not to say that the practitioner should actually disclose the information for he or she is still bound by the duty of confidentiality and loyalty owed to the client. The practitioner's first course of action should be to seek to obtain the client's instructions to reveal the information. If the practitioner considers the information in question to be material and the client does not agree to disclose it, it is submitted that the practitioner has good cause for refusing to continue to act for the client. In rare circumstances, a practitioner might disclose the information contrary to the client's instructions and argue that it was necessary to do so in order to discharge the higher duty to the administration of justice in any claim brought in relation to the breach of duties owed to the client.
6. A client's instructions to use mediation for an improper purpose appear to concern an objective of mediation and on the face of it, a lawyer would be bound to follow the instructions. However, although there is no clear authority on point, a lawyer who wanted to decline the brief in this situation might argue that it was a breach of his or her duty to the administration of justice to act for a client in these circumstances. Of course, many clients will not 'own up' that this is their objective and indeed it may not be their sole objective. Many clients will have mixed motives for participating in mediation and decisions about whether or not to act for them will not be so clear-cut.
7. A practitioner does not have to follow a client's instructions to play hard-ball. Practitioners may make tactical and technical decisions about how best to advance a client's objectives and they may choose their own preferred negotiation style.
150
In the next part of the article, I consider some proposals for new rules of conduct for legal representatives in mediation.
PROPOSALS FOR NEW RULES: CHALLENGERS FOR RULE DRAFTERS
A number of commentators have argued that new rules of conduct are needed for mediation practice. 151 Most recently, Mason has suggested that new rules for mediation advocates should be centred around three principles, as follows: 1. Lawyers should act in the client's best interests at all times. Interests can be protected by nonadversarial behaviour. This should be the norm in mediation settings. 2. Lawyers should act in good faith at all times in their dealings with all other participants in mediation, including the mediator. 3. Lawyers must never deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the mediator or knowingly allow the mediator to be misled.
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These proposals are considered in turn, in reverse order.
Increasing Standards of Honesty and Candour
Mason is not alone in suggesting that higher standards of honesty should be owed in mediation. Several authors have suggested that Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules should be amended. Alfini suggests that the word 'material' be omitted from Rule 4.1, thus forbidding lawyers from making any false statement of fact or law to a third person (a party or a mediator). 153 Peters suggests that Rule 4.1 be amended so as to prohibit the making of false statements about interests and priorities to another party or the mediator (Peters defines interests in such a way as to exclude value estimates and settlement intentions). 154 Under both of these proposals, some puffing and exaggeration would still be permitted.
Clearly rule drafters have to consider whether or not to attempt to prohibit all misleading statements in mediation or only those that relate to material facts and law (however material is defined). A distinction might also need to be made between statements of fact and law on the one hand, and on the other, statements of opinion. Arguably, it is unrealistic to prohibit all misleading statements in mediation. It seems almost to be universally accepted that 'some form of deceit, at least in the broadest sense of the word, is inherent in all negotiations'. 155 commenting on the difficulties of drafting a rule which requires truth-telling in mediation, Cooley argues that what is true for a party in mediation now (for example, their risks, desires, BATNAs 157 ) may not be true in 15 minutes from now as the parties continuously develop and share information and interact with the mediator. 158 Policy makers would need to consider and articulate the reasons why mediation should be treated any differently from unassisted negotiation. Some commentators argue that higher standards of honesty and candour are required in mediation because of the involvement of the mediator and the holding of separate sessions. 159 They argue that separate sessions create a deception synergy 160 leading to greater inaccuracy of information in a context in which the opponent is not present to test it. 161 Conversely, other commentators argue that separate sessions provide opportunity for mediators to 'converse directly about and indirectly around suspected misrepresentations'. 162 The holding of separate sessions does not in itself appear to justify an increase in the standards of honesty and candour owed by parties and their advisers.
The second part of Mason's proposal in relation to honesty and candour is problematic. Rule drafters would need to specify who should inform mediators that they have been misled and in what forum, that is, in a joint session with everyone present or in a separate session with the mediator. Problems loom if a lawyer is expected to correct his or her own client (involving a possible dismantling of the lawyer-client privilege) and to correct an opponent (an obligation which is not imposed when appearing before a court). These provisions have a flow-on effect to the mediator and are complicated by the holding of separate sessions in mediation. Most mediators and parties consider information divulged in separate sessions to be confidential. If a practitioner corrects a matter in a separate session, should the mediator be allowed or even required to pass on the correction to the other side?
It is noteworthy that Mason's proposal does not involve a raising of the standard of candour owed by practitioners, that is, they would still be under no obligation to reveal information save if it was necessary to prevent a mediator from being misled. Different suggestions have been made by other authors. Peters argues that lawyers should be required to disclose all facts known to them and known to be important to their counterpart. 163 MenkelMeadow proposes that Rule 4.1 and Rule 3.3 of the ABA Model Rules be amended 164 such that lawyers would have a positive duty to disclose relevant facts and law to an opponent, to a mediator and to a judge. There would be no safety in silence, and deflection or outright refusal to answer relevant questions would not be permitted. Other authors assert that the safety of silence should be maintained. For instance, Temkin argues that there ought to be some definite limits on the duty of candour in mediation, what he calls a 'silent safe harbor'. He maintains that:
[A]bsent court rule, principle of substantive law, or prior factual representation, an attorney should have no duty to make affirmative factual representations in the course of settlement negotiations, subject only to the crime/fraud exception contained in the Model Rules. In short, there should be a silent safe harbor. An attorney who makes no representations (and does not condone or repeat those of a client) makes no misrepresentations. Once an attorney speaks, what is said should be truthful, consistent with the attorney's duty to preserve client secrets and confidences. 165 This is where the 'line' on candour has been drawn in the professional conduct rules in the USA and the UK vis à vis mediators and opponents; and in Australia, vis à vis opponents. Currently practitioners in the USA and the UK do not have to reveal information to a mediator, while their counterparts in Australia appear to be under a duty to inform a mediator about relevant legal authorities and legislation. Just why they should have to do so when mediators do not have power to make decisions about substantive law matters, is unclear. Opponents are not owed a duty of candour in any jurisdiction -save for in the special circumstances discussed above. Rule drafters should consider if these lines on candour should be maintained. If a duty of candour is to be imposed, the extent of that duty must be specified. The questions for policy makers and rule drafters are: what information should legal representatives be required to disclose to whom and in what forum (joint or separate sessions) and what is the flow-on effect to mediators?
Caution is needed in dealing with what are essentially public policy matters. If lawyers were required to disclose adverse facts and information about a client's interests and bottom lines, few parties or lawyers would participate in mediation. Few clients would confide in their lawyers. Unrepresented clients might fare better than those who are represented. It might be better in the longer term to rely on mediators to earn the trust of the parties so that the parties feel comfortable enough to volunteer the information necessary to forge mutually satisfactory outcomes.
Imposing an Obligation to Act in Good Faith
Several authors have suggested that a good faith requirement should be imposed on participants in mediation. They argue that such a requirement will promote more constructive and meaningful participation. 166 While it is difficult to mount an argument that lawyers should be permitted to act in bad faith, it is another matter to require them to act in good faith. All authors who propose that a 'good faith' obligation be imposed have had difficulty defining the concept. Kovach offers a suggested 'Model Rule for Lawyers Requiring Good Faith Participation in the Mediation Process' 167 that consists of an itemised list of behaviours which would constitute good faith. Such behaviour includes: 168 • having all necessary decision makers present in person;
• 'coming to the mediation with an open mind'; 169 • 'demonstrating a willingness to listen and attempting to understand the other side'; 170 • 'taking into account the interests of the other parties'; 171 • having a willingness to discuss one's own position in detail, explaining the rationale for a particular offer or refusal of an offer; • participating in meaningful discussions with the mediator and all other participants, and • refraining from conveying information that is misleading or false. 172 But even this proposal does not give us a clear understanding of what good faith means or requires from a party or from his or her lawyer. 173 Most of the elements articulated by Kovach such as 'coming to the mediation with an open mind' 174 and 'attempting to understand the other side', depend on an assessment of a person's state of mind, that is, they are subjective and vague. 175 Even the seemingly objective requirement of having someone present with authority to settle poses a problem, for it may be difficult to know ahead of time what terms will be agreed to at mediation and who has the requisite authority to sanction the agreement. 176 A good faith requirement cannot be imposed unless everyone is clear about what it means and requires. There must be reliable guidelines for what is, and what is not, appropriate behaviour and objective grounds for sanctions. 177 There are other concerns with the imposition of a good faith duty, which cannot be investigated in depth here. They include the potential for: satellite litigation, 178 inroads to be made into the confidentiality of mediation (someone -usually the mediator must report goodfaith participation violations); 179 and abuse by mediators, 180 especially in mandatory programs where there is potential for coercion of the parties. 181 guidelines) assert that legal representatives should behave in a non-adversarial manner in mediation. 182 But what exactly is meant by non-adversarial behaviour (or adversarial behaviour) and are there circumstances in which a lawyer might have valid reason for acting more adversarially than less adversarially to protect the interests of a client? The term 'nonadversarial' may prove as difficult to define as that of 'good faith'.
Another issue which is often discussed in this context is whether or not advocacy has a place in mediation. Mason and many other commentators support the use of advocacy in mediation 183 (some authors have described it as conflict resolution advocacy). 184 If by advocacy, we mean the use of persuasion on behalf of our client, then it is well placed in mediation. In mediation, an advocate will try to persuade the other side that a particular option represents an optimal solution for all concerned. 185 Advocacy can even be a cooperate exercise. Bordone speaks of advocates engaging in joint problem-solving, 186 while Macfarlane speaks of the advocate working with the other side. 187 An advocate will consider solutions that accommodate the interests of other parties as well as those of their client, and help clients to see that solutions, not judgments, may be in their best interests. 188 • Making high demands; • Exaggerating; • Posturing (using emotional displays and manipulation);
• Misleading (even passively so); • Bullying, and • '[M]aking concessions only to the extent necessary to get greater concessions from the other side '. 193 Much of this behaviour could be labelled as the tactics of positional negotiation. Presumably, the following behaviour could be categorised as non-adversarial:
• Taking a non-aggressive stance;
• Making moderate demands;
• Moving from positions to reveal interests;
• Sharing information;
• Disclosing the client's real goals and bottom line;
• Making reciprocal concessions;
• Not misleading.
Apart from the fact that these terms are imprecise (is all exaggeration impermissible?), this type of list drawing assumes a clear dichotomy, and a clear choice, between negotiation approaches and tactics. This is one of a number of assumptions which underlie proposals for new rules of conduct for mediation advocates. Such assumptions are explored next.
SHAKY DICHOTOMIES AND ASSUMPTIONS
Negotiation is Either Cooperative or Competitive
Some proponents for new rules for mediation advocates assert that they should use interest-based negotiation (also referred to as principled, problem-solving or cooperative negotiation). 194 So called cooperative tactics (for example, being open, sharing information and not misleading about minimum requirements) are thought appropriate to interest-based negotiation while more competitive tactics (making high opening offers and small and slow concessions, concealing and misrepresenting information, threatening and bluffing) are generally associated with positional negotiation. 195 But this dichotomy is unsound. Commentators agree that most negotiations involve both a cooperative and competitive stage and that effective negotiators move between these two approaches depending on the stage of negotiation. 196 Negotiators may simultaneously (or sequentially) employ both cooperative concludes that while the 'adversarial/materialistic perspective' of advocates has been criticised, ' [y]et it is precisely the stance of partisanship that causes representative lawyersadvocates -to provide the fullest possible information to their clients'. 210 At the same time, lawyers can remind clients that 'merit' is only one matter that they should be considering 211 and encourage them to look at broader interests and their relationship with the other party.
Lawyers Act Inappropriately in Mediation
The call for new rules to 'curb the adversarial imperative' rests on an assumption that lawyers use excessive adversarial zeal in mediation and that such behaviour is prevalent enough to change the rules of conduct.
We know a good deal about how lawyers can be helpful in mediation. 212 Many authors, including Mason, acknowledge that there are good reasons for lawyers to be present. However, we do not know much about the way in which lawyers behave in mediation or about why they behave the way they do.
In Australia and in the USA, only limited research has been conducted on the nature of lawyers' behaviour in mediation. 213 The little evidence that is available is anecdotal, 214 dated, 215 based on small sample groups, 216 or confined to mediation in particular contexts 217 empirical research ... is too limited in several respects to be able to conclude that lawyers either play an essential role in mediation or are not needed, or that they are particularly helpful or detrimental to the mediation process'. 219 There is no conclusive evidence that lawyers act inappropriately in mediation by bullying, being rude, misleading and taking unfair advantage of their opponent. There is some evidence that although lawyers are trained in adversarial techniques they are as likely to be conciliatory as combative in practice 220 -but this evidence also needs to be tested and verified before any conclusions about lawyers' behaviour can be made.
CONCLUSION: DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
This article has considered a number of ethical dilemmas which might confront legal representatives in mediation and has attempted to demonstrate that they can be satisfactorily resolved through use of the existing rules of professional conduct. The rules discussed here are the minimum standards of conduct owed by practitioners. Candour and cooperation are not prohibited by the rules. '[L]awyers are not ethically required to press for every advantage, take every permissible step, react to every point raised, or to otherwise play hardball'. 221 'Nothing in the rules imposes an obligation to act in a win-lose manner designed to deprive opposing parties of fair terms'. 222 The existing rules enable lawyers to cooperate, collaborate and use joint problem-solving methods, in the appropriate circumstances. This is perfectly consistent with the discharge of duties owed to a client for it will often times be in the best interests of the client for a lawyer to act cooperatively. So too there are many reasons why it might be in the client's best interests to be fully candid with a mediator (for example, it might lead to the formation of a mutually satisfactory outcome, one which is not susceptible to later attack).
The rules in Australia and the USA do need some finetuning. Rule drafters in Australia should specify if the reference to 'mediations' in the definition of 'court' means 'mediators' and if so, provide some guidance as to whether or not required disclosures should be made in joint or separate sessions. If disclosures are to be made in separate sessions, the flow-on effects for mediators must also be considered. In the USA, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility might consider the wider impact of its opinion. 223 The Committee has not explained why a judge-mediator should be owed a higher standard of honesty and candour than that owed to third parties. Rule drafters in both jurisdictions should provide a rationale for treating a mediator as a court (judge). Given that mediators have no power to make substantive law decisions, it is not clear why they should be advised of legal authorities and legislation. If the mischief at which these provisions are aimed is misleading statements (and half-truths), rather than lack of candour, it is sufficient that mediators are treated as third parties.
